A Three-Party Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange (3PAKE) protocol allows two users to establish a secure session key over an insecure communication channel with the help of a third party, which is a trusted server. Recently, Lou and Huang proposed a 3PAKE which is efficient and suitable for running on resourceconstrained devices such as smart cards and mobile phones. In this paper, we show that their scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack and partition attack. We then propose an efficient method to fix these problems. Additionally, the mutual authentication and session key secrecy of the proposed protocol are verified using a formal verification tool.
Introduction
Two-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol was introduced by Bellovin and Merritt [1] in 1992. The protocol allows two parties to authenticate each other via a public, insecure network and establish a secure session key which is to be used for protecting their subsequent communication. However, the protocol is not scalable in a large-scale peer-to-peer system, since every pair of communication parties needs to share a password, so that each party in an n-party system has to maintain n-1 passwords. To solve this problem, Three-Party Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange (3PAKE) protocols were introduced [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . In a 3PAKE protocol, each user only shares a password with a trusted third-party server which gets involved in every session for helping the parties to establish secure session keys. A secure 3PAKE protocol should defend against both passive and active adversaries. One of the well-known attacks against passwordbased cryptographic protocols is password guessing attack, since users' passwords are usually short and easy to remember. Password guessing attacks can generally be classified into three categories [3] :
(1) Detectable on-line password guessing attack: an attacker tries a possible password on-line each time and determines the correctness of the guessed password by the response from the server. An incorrect password can be detected and logged by the server.
(2) Undetectable password guessing attack: an attacker verifies the guessed passwords through other channels with the server, such that an incorrect password cannot be detected or logged by the server.
(3) Off-line password guessing attack: an attacker verifies the guessed passwords off-line. No participation of the server is required, so the attack cannot be detected by the server.
Related work
In 2007, Lu and Cao [4] proposed an efficient 3PAKE which is found vulnerable against off-line password guessing attack and man-in-the-middle attack [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . In 2009, Huang [11] proposed another scheme in which the server does not need to have a public key. However, Yoon and Yoo [12] showed that the protocol is vulnerable to undetectable password guessing attack and off-line password guessing attack.
In 2011, Lou and Huang [13] proposed a new 3PAKE protocol which can be implemented on an elliptic curve group, and is suitable for resourceconstrained devices such as mobile phones and smartcards. They claimed that the protocol can achieve security against various password guessing attacks.
In this paper, we show that Lou and Huang's scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack and partition attack. In addition, we propose an improved scheme to solve these problems. The protocol also enjoys low computational complexity and is suitable for resource-constrained devices. There were also several recent schemes proposed in the literature [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] , however, none of them attempted to give an appropriate solution to the issue above.
Paper organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review Lou and Huang's scheme. In Section 3, an off-line password guessing attack and a partition attack against their scheme are described in details. In Section 4, we propose an improved scheme and analyze its security in Section 5. After that, we use the ProVerif tool to prove the mutual authentication and security of the proposed protocol in Section 6. The paper is concluded in Section 7.
Review of Lou-Huang 3PAKE protocol
In this section, we briefly review Lou and Huang's 3PAKE protocol [13] . The system chooses a large prime q , an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field q F , a cyclic group G P = < > of points over E , where P is a generator of E with order n . 
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Attacks on Lou-Huang 3PAKE protocol
In this section, we show that Lou and Huang's 3PAKE is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack and partition attack.
Off-line password guessing attack
It seems that Lou and Huang's protocol can defend against off-line password guessing attack as A pw , B pw and t cannot be computed from A R and B R due to the intractability of Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). However, we will show that this kind of attack can be amounted against their protocol. The reason is that the users A and B have no direct authentication on whether A R and B R are sent by TS. According to the security model proposed by Dolev and Yao [21] , an active attacker can control the communication channels through intercepting the communication and inserting data into the channels. Below are the details of our attacks.
Suppose A is a malicious user who targets for user B's password, A performs as follows.
Step 1: A randomly chooses an integer C and a point ' B R over E , and computes
Step 
A B R R .
Step 3: After obtaining
and sends B S and ' B R to A.
Step 4: After getting B S and 
A B R R . Then the attacker can launch the above off-line password guessing attack.
Partition attack
We now describe another attack against LouHuang 3PAKE. In the protocol, the output value of the hash function is a random number. We show that this allows an attacker to launch partition attack to eliminate more than one trial password by simply eavesdropping the communication among A, 
The improved protocol
In this section, we propose an improved 3PAKE and provide a security analysis of this scheme against various attacks. The basic ideas of our constructions are as follows: (1) 
Perfect forward secrecy
In the improved scheme, the session key is tt P and a tt P , but he is not able to compute the session key of any previously established sessions due to the intractability of CDH problem.
Replay attack
Suppose that an adversary impersonates A and replays A's message { , , } B Z F ) to B (or TS). However, the adversary's response message A S (or B S ) cannot pass the verification process of B (or A) as the password is unknown.
Forgery attack and impersonation

An adversary may impersonate
Denning-Sacco attack
Even if an adversary gets the session key a b K t tt P = , he cannot get a t P , b t P , b tt P and a tt P due to the intractability of ECDLP. Therefore, the adversary cannot get TS's secret key d , A and B's passwords from ,
Z F , A R and B R .
Known-key security
Due to the randomness and independence of generating a t , b t and t in all the sessions, the session key a b K t tt P = of each session is independent. Therefore, an adversary is unable to compute either previous or future session keys given a session key.
Man-in-the-middle attack
If an adversary mounts man-in-the-middle attack by impersonation and replay attack, the adversary cannot gain any advantage due to the reasons given above. Next, we analyze if a malicious insider Eve can succeed in launching man-in-the-middle attack.
When B sends { , , , , , } Therefore, the improved scheme can resist man-inthe-middle attack.
Performance comparison
The differences between the improved scheme and Lou-Huang scheme are in the generation of A R , B R and K and the hash function. As we can see, our scheme has four more hash operations than LouHuang scheme, more precisely, the user A and user B have one more hash operation respectively, while the trusted server TS has two more hash operations. On the other hand, our scheme has four less modular multiplication computations than Lou-Huang scheme, more precisely, the user A and user B have one less modular multiplication computation respectively, while TS does not need to perform modular multiplication. Therefore, the improved scheme not only enhances security, but also keeps efficiency. 
Protocol verification
In this section, we use ProVerif tool [20] to prove that the proposed protocol satisfies the mutual authentication and session key secrecy. In the formal model, the protocol was modeled as the parallel execution of three distinct processes: the user A, the user B and the server: process pUserA | pUserB |!pTS
The processes are replicated in order to model that several users may communicate with the server at the same time. ,A,B) ))) in out(sch2,(xA,xZA,xFA,xB,ZB,FB)); event beginUserB(A,B); in(sch2,(zA:bitstring,zB:bitstring,zRA:bitstring,z RB:bitstring)); let K1=add(zRA,h(((PWB,zB,zA)))) in let K=mult(tb,K1) in let SB=h((K,zB)) in out(sch1,(zA,zB,zRB,SB)); in(sch1,(pA:bitstring,pB:bitstring,pSA:bitstring)); let SA'=h((K,pA)) in if SA'=pSA then let sk=mult(tb,K1) in event endUserB(zA,zB).
The server process is modeled as: let pTS= in(sch2,(yA:bitstring,yZA:bitstring,yFA:bitstring, yB:bitstring,yZB:bitstring,yFB:bitstring)); let QA=add(yZA,h(((PWA,yA,yB)))) in let FA'=mult(d,QA) in let QB=add(yZB,h(((PWB,yA,yB)))) in let FB'=mult(d,QB) in if FA'=yFA then if FB'=yFB then new t:bitstring; let rA=mult(t,QA) in let rB=mult(t,QB) in let RA=add(rA,h(((PWB,yB,yA)))) in let RB=add(rB,h(((PWB,yB,yA)))) in out(sch2,(yA,yB,RA,RB)).
The secrecy of the session key is modeled as the following query and events: query attacker(sk). event beginUserA(bitstring,bitstring). event endUserA(bitstring,bitstring). event beginUserB(bitstring,bitstring). event endUserB(bitstring,bitstring).
The mutual authentication of the protocol is modeled as the following queries: query id:bitstring; inj-event(endUserA(id,id)) ==> inj-event(beginUserA(id,id)) . query id:bitstring; inj-event(endUserB(id,id)) ==> inj-event(beginUserB(id,id)) . The readers may refer to the online demo for ProVerif: http://proverif.rocq.inria.fr/index.php to test above codes. The outputs by this formal verification tool show that the proposed scheme can pass all the evaluations. Hence, our protocol is secure, in the sense that it provides both mutual authentication and session key secrecy.
Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that Lou and Huang 3PAKE protocol is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack and partition attack. In addition, we not only propose a security-enhanced scheme for solving these problems, but also keep the efficiency of the scheme. One of our future work is to study on how to build a provably secure protocol while maintaining the efficiency when compared with the protocol we proposed in this paper.
